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IN MEMORIAL
On August 2, 2007 43-year-old 
Constable Robert Plunkett of the 
York Regional Police Service was 
injured when he was run down by a 
vehicle during an airbag theft 
investigation in Markham, Ontario.
Constable Plunkett was struck by a 
car and dragged while performing 
undercover surveillance during an 
investigation near the Pacific Mall 
in the Steeles Avenue and Kennedy 
Road area. He was taken to 
hospital, where he died from his 
injuries.
Constable Plunkett was a 22 year 
veteran of the York Regional Police 
Service. He is survived by his wife and 
three children.
On October 6, 2007 30-year old 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
Constable Christopher Worden was 
shot and killed while responding to 
a complaint at a home in Hay River, 
in the Northwest Territories, at  
approximately 5:00 am. Dispatchers 
lost radio contact with him after he 
arrived at the scene, and then sent additional units to 
check on him. The responding constables found 
Constable Worden suffering from gunshot wounds. 
The suspect was later apprehended.
Constable Worden had served with the 
RCMP for 5 years. He is survived by his 
wife and eight-month-old child.
Source: Officer Down Memorial Page, available at 
www.odmp.org/canada.
OFFICERS PAY TRIBUTE TO 
FALLEN
On Sunday September 30, 2007 hundreds 
of law enforcement officers from Canada 
and the United States attended a memorial 
service at the British Columbia Law 
Enforcement Memorial located on the 
grounds of the Legislature in Victoria, B.C.
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e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
“The newsletter is 
exactly what I have 
been looking for to keep 
me abreast of legal developments etc. 
in law enforcement. Can I get you to add me to your 
mailing list?” - Police Constable, Ontario
*********
“I love the newsletter and use it very 
often to disseminate information to our 
officers. It is awesome, keep up the 
great work. The guys in training know how hard it is to 
keep up on this stuff and we appreciate all your hard 
work” - Police Constable, Training Bureau, Ontario 
*********
“I’ve been receiving your publication 
from my Inspector and really enjoy the 
material you present.” - Police Staff 
Sergeant, Staff Planning, Ontario
*********
“I have read your issues on several 
occasions and think they are awesome. 
They have been very useful at work. Keep 
up the excellent work.” - Police Constable, British 
Columbia
*********
“I am a Crown Prosecutor. Another 
prosecutor sent me a copy of your 
newsletter which I found very 
interesting and helpful. Please add me to your e-mail 
list.” - Crown Prosecutor, Alberta
*********
“As someone who is considering a future 
career in law enforcement after a 
successful one in the military, I find your 
newsletter to be very informative. It is an interesting 
read by itself, but I find it a more prudent read to 
understand what real policing entails. It gives 
wonderful insight to the part of the law enforcement 
career not often considered by the general public, or 
even those considering a career in the same field. 
Bravo-Zulu for your good work and most interesting 
publication.” - Citizen, British Columbia 
*********
I go online and look for [your newsletter] 
every couple of months. It is an invaluable 
tool.” - Military Criminal Investigator, 
Nova Scotia
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IN-SERVICE LEGAL ROAD TEST
The “In Service” Legal 
Road Test is a simple 
multiple choice quiz 
designed to challenge your 
understanding of the law. 
Each question is based on a case featured in this issue. 
See page 21 for the answers.
1. Every inducement to an arrestee held out by a person 
in authority, no matter how strong, will render a 
statement involuntary under the confessions rule.
 (a) True
 (b) False
2. No-knock forced entries pursuant to a general police 
practice, without any consideration to exigencies 
such as evidence destruction or safety concerns, will 
nonetheless always be reasonable under s.8 of the 
Charter.
 (a) True
 (b) False
3. If counsel of choice is not available within a 
reasonable amount of time, an arrestee will be 
expected to exercise their right to counsel under 
s.10(b) of the Charter by calling a different lawyer. 
 (a) True
 (b) False
4. Once an officer decides to arrest a person if they 
were to flee, that person is always “detained” for the 
purposes of  s.9 of the Charter.  
 (a) True
 (b) False
5. The circumstances of an accident can be taken into 
account when an officer is forming their reasonable 
grounds to arrest a person for impaired driving.
 (a) True
 (b) False
6. Strict pre-trial house arrest can form part of a 
minimum mandatory sentence once the accused is 
convicted.
    (a) True
 (b) False
BC’s 25 Top Stolen Vehicles (2006)
Rank Make Model
1 Chrysler (Dodge/Plymouth) Caravan/Voyager
2 Honda Civic
3 Ford F-Series (F150,F250,F350)
4 Honda Accord
5 Chrysler (Dodge/Plymouth) Neon
6 Dodge Ram
7 Jeep Cherokee 
8 Toyota Camry
9 Nissan Pathfinder
10 Acura Integra
11 Mazda B2200/B2600 Pick-up
12 Nissan 240
13 Toyota 4 Runner
14 Dodge Dakota
15 Dodge Durango
16 GMC Sierra
17 Chrysler Intrepid
18 Dodge Spirit
19 Plymouth Acclaim
20 Ford Taurus
21 Ford Explorer
22 Ford Mustang
23 VW Passat
24 GMC G3500
25 Chevrolet Cavalier
Source: www.icbc.com
DID YOU KNOW...that Canada’s motor vehicle 
theft rate was 487 per 100,000 population in 2006, down 
2% from 2005. BC’s rate was 682 while the Abbotsford 
Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) was 1,155, the 
Vancouver CMA 745, and the Victoria CMA 380. 
Manitoba had the highest motor vehicle theft rate at 
1,376 with Winnipeg topping out the CMA rates at 1,932 
stolen vehicles per 100,000. Source: Statistics Canada, 2007, Crime 
Statistics in Canada, 2006, Catalogue No:85-002-XIE
www.10-8.ca
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statements ruled inadmissible, and the convictions 
were overturned. The majority found the trial judge 
applied the wrong test and considered irrelevant 
factors, such as who proposed the deal, the 
accused’s attitude and demeanour, and whether the 
police and the accused were on a the level playing 
field. The lone dissent found the trial judge did the 
correct analysis, both legally and factually. 
The Crown then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada. In a 6:2 judgment, the Supreme Court 
reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision. Justice 
Deschamps, writing the Court’s majority opinion, 
concluded the trial judge correctly applied the law 
and his finding that the confession was voluntary was 
entitled to deference. 
Statement Voluntariness
Under the common law statements made by an 
accused to a person in authority are inadmissible as 
evidence unless the Crown proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt that they were voluntary. In 
deciding whether a statement is voluntary a court 
must consider several factors including:
Promises
Promises considered in the 
voluntariness analysis need not 
be directed at the accused to 
have a coercive effect, as was 
the allegation in this case. A 
quid pro quo offer is the most 
important consideration when 
an inducement is alleged, 
however, it does not occupy 
“centre stage” — voluntariness 
does. Although important, quid 
NOT EVERY INDUCEMENT WILL 
RENDER STATEMENT 
INVOLUNTARY
R. v. Spencer, 2007 SCC 11
The accused was arrested while driving 
a vehicle associated to three robberies. 
The vehicle was registered to his 
girlfriend, later arrested for one of the 
robberies. A handgun and property (watches and 
jewellery) from a robbery was found after police 
executed a search warrant at their shared 
residence. The accused asked a police officer what 
was going to happen to his girlfriend and was told 
they would both be charged with possession of the 
handgun and the jewellery. The accused offered to 
confess if the police went easy on his girlfriend. The 
interrogating officer said he could not make such a 
deal but could hear his story and make 
recommendations. The accused also asked to see his 
girlfriend. After the accused confessed to some of 
the robberies, he was allowed to visit his girlfriend. 
He then confessed to more robberies and was 
subsequently charged with 18 counts of robbery. 
During a voir dire in British Columbia Supreme Court 
the trial judge ruled the statements were voluntary 
and therefore admissible. He found there were no 
threats or quid pro quo offers made in response to 
the accused’s repeated requests for his girlfriend’s 
leniency. Nor was he promised that she would not be 
charged. He merely appealed to the accused’s 
common sense and knowledge of the criminal justice 
system. Allowing the visit with his girlfriend was a 
small inducement, but not strong enough to raise a 
reasonable doubt about whether the accused’s free 
will was overborne. The accused was convicted.
The accused appealed 
to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing 
his statements were 
inadmissible because 
they were not made 
voluntarily; he was 
induced to confess by 
hope of leniency for his 
girlfriend and promised 
a visit with her. In a 2:1 
judgment, the appeal 
was allowed, the 
LATIN LEGAL LINGO:
“quid pro quo”- something for something; what 
for what; a mutual consideration; that which a party 
receives or is promised in return for something 
promised, given, or done; getting something of 
value in return for giving something of value; 
securing an advantage or receiving a concession in 
return for a similar favour; for example, an express 
or implied promise that, in return for a suspect’s 
confession, the officer would do something such as 
reduce charges or suggest a lighter sentence.
To be considered together
A distinct enquiry
www.10-8.ca
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pro quo is neither an exclusive factor in assessing 
nor one determinative of voluntariness. Rather, the 
determination will be contextual and the court must 
be sensitive to the particularities of the individual. 
Thus, not every quid pro quo held out will necessarily 
render a statement involuntary. The quid pro quo 
must be strong enough to raise a reasonable doubt 
about whether the will of the individual has been 
overborne. 
“While a quid pro quo is an important factor in 
establishing the existence of a threat or promise, it 
is the strength of the inducement, having regard to 
that particular individual and his or her 
circumstances, that is to be considered in the overall 
contextual analysis into the voluntariness of the 
accused’s statement,” said Justice Deschamps. 
In this case, the trial judge considered all of the 
relevant circumstances and properly applied the law. 
Justice Charron stated:
In my view, the trial judge made no error of law in 
concluding that no offer of leniency was made in 
respect of [the accused’s girlfriend] and that the 
withholding of a visit to her until at least a partial 
confession was made was an inducement that was 
not strong enough to render the accused’s 
statements inadmissible. It was a relevant factor 
that the accused had not “lost control of the 
interview to the point where he and [the officer 
were] no longer playing on a level field”....   In 
Oickle, [Justice Iacobucci] explicitly recognized 
that “[t]he absence of oppression is important not 
only in its own right, but also because it affects 
the overall voluntariness analysis”. 
It was also relevant to the particularities of the 
[accused] that, according to the trial judge, he 
was aggressive and a “mature and savvy 
participant”, and that he unsuccessfully 
attempted many times to secure “deals” with the 
police.   While none of these factors are 
determinative, it was not an error for the trial 
judge to consider them in his contextual analysis. 
[paras. 20-21]
Another View
The minority took a different position. In their view, 
the will of the individual need only be overborne in 
the sense that they would not otherwise have given 
a statement except to avoid pain or achieve promise 
gained. There is no need that they lost any 
meaningful independent ability to choose to remain 
silent. The minority agreed that threats or promises 
(explicit or implicit) need not be aimed at the 
accused, but could be directed to someone closely 
related to them such as telling a mother her 
daughter would not be charged with shoplifting if 
the mother confessed to a similar offence. 
Justice Fish, writing the minority’s judgment, 
concluded the police made a “compound quid pro 
quo—an implicit but unmistakable threat [to bring 
criminal charges against his girlfriend unless he 
confessed] accompanied by an implicit but 
unmistakable promise [recommend no charges 
against his girlfriend if he confessed].” He then 
immediately admitted to the robberies. The minority 
would have affirmed the Court of Appeal’s ruling 
overturning the accused’s conviction. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and the accused’s 
conviction restored. 
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
NO-KNOCK DECISION BASED ON 
INFO KNOWN TO POLICE PRIOR 
TO FORCING ENTRY 
R. v. DeWolfe, 2007 NSCA 79
As a result of receiving information 
from three separate sources, police 
obtained a warrant to search the 
accused’s residence, believed to be a 
crack shop. They were also told he kept a young 
pitbull at the residence to act as a deterrent for 
police and rival drug dealers. The warrant was 
executed shortly after 2:00 am by hard entry. Police 
used a battering ram to break down the door while 
contemporaneously yelling “police—search warrant.” 
The accused’s wife was found in bed without her 
clothes on. The police seized 0.2 grams of cocaine 
wrapped in tinfoil in the accused’s pants pocket, 26 
grams found above a dryer vent, digital scales, and 
$680 in cash. He was charged with possessing 
cocaine for the purpose of trafficking
At trial in Nova Scotia Provincial Court the accused 
argued, in part, that the method of police entry — 
making a hard entry into the premises — was 
unreasonable and violated his s.8 Charter rights. In 
the judge’s view, the police made a hard entry 
because that was their policy and practice for drug 
searches in the area. “As a result of this practice, 
the police … neglected to exercise their discretion 
www.10-8.ca6
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as the events of the early 
morning hours unfolded,” 
said the trial judge. 
She ruled the police should 
have re-evaluated their no-
knock decision when they 
found the residence in 
darkness and tried the 
door to see if it was 
unlocked. “An ‘unannounced’ 
entry into a family home by 
seven officers in the middle of the night would have 
been a sufficient and significant intrusion … and 
would have served to provide the required shock 
value being sought.” As well, the trial judge noted, no 
dog was found at the residence and police should 
have had a female officer present, expecting to find 
the accused’s wife naked in bed. The evidence was 
excluded under s.24(2) and the accused was 
acquitted.  
On appeal by Crown to the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal, the Court first examined the “knock and 
notice” rule: 
At common law, in the ordinary case, before 
forcing entry into a private dwelling, police 
officers, should give: (1) notice of presence by 
knocking or ringing a doorbell; (2) notice of 
authority by identifying themselves as law 
enforcement officers; and (3) notice of purpose 
by stating a lawful reason for entry.   This rule is 
subject to an exception for “exigent 
circumstances”.  [para. 16]
And further:
There is no express reference in the CDSA to 
"exigent circumstances".   As   developed in the 
case law, exigent circumstances are generally 
found to exist where the police have reasonable 
grounds to be concerned that prior announcement 
would: (i) expose those executing the warrant to 
harm and/or (ii) result in loss or destruction of 
evidence and/or (iii) expose the occupants to 
harm. 
These same factors - officer or occupant safety 
or destruction of evidence - are the elements of 
exigent circumstances where that term is defined 
in the Criminal Code…(see, for example, s. 529.3 
authorizing a warrantless entry into a dwelling 
house). [paras. 24-25]
As for whether the 
police in this case had 
the necessary exigent 
circumstances justifying 
a hard entry under the 
common law rule, the 
Court found the trial 
judge erred. The police 
testified about what 
they considered in 
deciding whether to 
effect a hard entry. These considerations were 
informed by source information and surveillance, 
such as:
• the drug dealer’s criminal history and associates; 
• the number of people expected in the residence; 
• whether children would be present; 
• the geographical make-up of the search location 
— the physical layout and location of the general 
area and premises; 
• the presence of deterrent measures — whether 
there was counter-surveillance, barricades, 
dogs, and/or weapons; and 
• threat assessments with respect to the public 
near the search location and the officers 
conducting the search.
As well, the general knowledge of the type of drug 
investigation is relevant to the assessment of the 
danger involved, for which the police laid a proper 
evidentiary foundation. They testified, in their 
experience, that crack shops involved the following:
• they are sporadic, being established from time 
to time until taken down by the police or rival 
drug traffickers.   In the chain of distribution, 
crack shops are a step above street level sales; 
• they operate on a 24-hour, 7 day per week basis; 
• they are in a location where one can obtain a 
supply of crack cocaine, typically from a 
residence utilized for the sale of the drug;
• people are employed to work in shifts, given the 
fact that the sales take place 24-hours per day; 
• it is not uncommon for the operators to erect 
barricades to deter the police or to protect the 
supply of drugs from theft or robbery from rival 
dealers; 
• operators of crack shops try to limit the quantity 
of drugs kept on location to limit losses in the 
event of police search activity or theft; 
“At common law, in the ordinary case, before 
forcing entry into a private dwelling, police 
officers, should give: (1) notice of presence by 
knocking or ringing a doorbell; (2) notice of 
authority by identifying themselves as law 
enforcement officers; and (3) notice of purpose 
by stating a lawful reason for entry.   This rule is 
subject to an exception for ‘exigent 
circumstances’”. 
www.10-8.ca
7
Volume 7 Issue 5
September/October 2007
• actions by rival traffickers present a real and 
significant threat to operators of crack shops.  
In some cases, they impersonate the police to 
attempt to obtain compliance of the crack shop 
operator.   In other cases, the actions taken by 
rival traffickers may involve threats, 
intimidation, assaults, fire bombings, killings, 
etc. 
• crack shop operators will attempt to deter rival 
traffickers by several methods, including hiring 
look-outs to warn of approaching police or rivals, 
obtaining aggressive dogs, such as pit-bulls or 
Rottweillers, or arm themselves with firearms or 
other weapons. 
• crack shops are known to exist throughout the 
Halifax Regional Municipality, but Spryfield and 
the Gottingen/Uniacke street areas are 
predominant areas for sales of crack cocaine; 
• the method of distributing crack in these areas 
varies for a number of reasons, including 
whether operators are incarcerated 
and the extent to which a crack shop 
may impinge on street level 
distribution; 
• drug trade violence is well known to 
the Uniacke Square area, and has 
resulted in numerous baseball bat 
assaults, countless shootings, 
including those involving police 
officers, and at least six murders in 
that immediate area;  
• counter-surveillance is known to exist 
in the area to alert drug dealers to 
police presence; 
• when occupants of crack shops are alerted to 
police presence in advance of search activity, 
officer safety is compromised and the possibility 
of destruction of evidence increases; and
• experience has established that so-called "hard 
entries" enhance officer safety and decrease 
the opportunity for crack shop operators to 
destroy evidence.  
Unlike cases where police force entry under a 
general no knock policy with no evidence of officer 
safety or evidence destruction issues, there was 
evidence in this case suggesting concerns about 
safety and loss of evidence. The Court stated:
Here, there was cogent evidence of risks to 
officer safety arising from the nature of the 
operation (retail crack distribution); [the 
accused’s] criminal history of threats and 
weapons charges; the known counter-surveillance 
in Uniacke Square; and the anticipated presence 
of a pit bull in the residence.  In addition, there 
was a real chance of the destruction of the 
relatively small quantity of crack cocaine should 
the police announce their presence or be detected 
by counter-surveillance.   Finally, the police were 
worried about occupant safety arising from the 
possibility of weapons and the presence of 
children.  The judge did not discount this evidence 
or suggest that it did not provide sufficient 
reasons for a forced entry. [para. 42]
………
The judge seems to have concluded that the fact 
that the police did not re-evaluate the planned 
forced entry upon arriving at the scene, 
demonstrates that they were acting only in 
accordance with a policy to force entry and not 
due to exigent circumstances.  
 
It is my respectful view 
that the judge erred in 
two ways: (i) in failing to 
consider whether the 
exigent circumstances 
which warranted the police 
planning a forced entry 
had changed when the 
police reached the door of 
the residence; and (ii) by 
taking into account facts 
which could not have been 
known to the police prior 
to entry and, in any event, 
which were not relevant to the decision to force 
entry.  The decision to force entry must be made 
on the information available to the police in 
advance of the search.  Just as the “Crown cannot 
rely upon ex post facto justifications” ... neither 
can the defence attack the decision on the basis 
of circumstances that were not reasonably known 
to the police.
 
The judge did not elaborate upon how the fact 
that the windows of the residence were in 
darkness when the police arrived negated their 
legitimate concerns about officer and occupant 
safety and the destruction of the evidence.  
 
The judge’s criticisms of the forced entry were: 
(i) the police should have tried the handle to the 
front door of the residence to determine if it was 
unlocked; (ii) they should have had a female 
“The decision to force entry 
must be made on the 
information available to the 
police in advance of the search.  
Just as the “Crown cannot rely 
upon ex post facto justifications” 
... neither can the defence 
attack the decision on the basis 
of circumstances that were not 
reasonably known to the police.”
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officer present, anticipating that they might find 
[the accused’s] wife...in bed without clothes on (as 
it turned out, was the case); (iii) they should have 
made a less dramatic entry to occasion less stress 
to the children; and (iv) a dog was not found at 
[the residence].
 
The danger to the police in testing the door to the 
premises is obvious. As [the detective] testified - 
it risked alerting the occupants (including the 
dog) to the presence of an intruder and, even if 
the door knob is unlocked, there may be a bolt, 
chains or barricades which prevent entry.   The 
occupants would not know whether it was the 
police or rival drug dealers and might respond with 
weapons or other deterrent measures.   That 
children were present and would likely be in bed, 
thus safer, was a factor considered by the police.  
They were aware that [the accused’s] wife lived in 
the premises.  In executing the warrant at 2:20 
a.m. it would not be surprising to find the 
occupants in bed.  That [the accused] would be in 
bed without clothing could not have been known to 
the police in advance, nor did it have any relevance 
to their concerns for officer safety and 
destruction of the evidence.  Neither did the fact 
that the occupants were in bed mean they would 
not have had an opportunity to destroy the 
evidence had the police announced their presence 
and awaited entry.  Finally...one of the occupants 
of [the residence], testified that [the accused] 
had kept a pit bull in residence, but that the dog 
was stolen before the search.  It is my respectful 
view that the issues identified by the judge do not 
contradict the police assessment that there were 
exigent circumstances warranting a forced entry.  
[para. 45-49]
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal concluded the trial 
judge did not determine whether exigent 
circumstances existed in this case even if it was the 
general police practice to effect hard entries. By 
failing to consider relevant factors and by 
considering irrelevant factors (information learned 
after entry) the trial judge erred in holding the 
manner of search breached s.8 of the Charter. The 
Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Note-able Quote
“Never tire in doing good” - Galatians 6:9
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Informer Privilege
“Police work, and the criminal justice system 
as a whole, depend to some degree on the 
work of confidential informers.  The law has 
therefore long recognized that those who 
choose to act as confidential informers must 
be protected from the possibility of retribution.  The law’s 
protection has been provided in the form of the informer privilege 
rule, which protects from revelation in public or in court the 
identity of those who give information related to criminal matters 
in confidence.  This protection in turn encourages cooperation 
with the criminal justice system for future potential informers.
.........
The rule applies to the identity of every informer: it applies when 
the informer is not present, where the informer is present, and 
even where the informer himself or herself is a witness.  It applies 
to both documentary evidence and oral testimony. It applies in 
criminal and civil trials.  The duty imposed to keep an informer’s 
identity confidential applies to the police, to the Crown, to 
attorneys and to judges.   The rule’s protection is also broad in 
its coverage.  Any information which might tend to identify an 
informer is protected by the privilege.  Thus the protection is not 
limited simply to the informer’s name, but extends to any 
information that might lead to identification.
.........
The informer privilege rule admits but one exception: it can be 
abridged if necessary to establish innocence in a criminal trial 
(there are no exceptions to the rule in civil proceedings).  
According to the innocence at stake exception, “there must be 
a basis on the evidence for concluding that disclosure of the 
informer’s identity is necessary to demonstrate the innocence of 
the accused”. It stands to be emphasized that the exception will 
apply only if there is an evidentiary basis for the conclusion; mere 
speculation will not suffice. The exception applies only where 
disclosure of the informer’s identity is the only way that the 
accused can establish innocence. 
.........
[T]he general rationale for the informer privilege rule requires a 
privilege which is extremely broad and powerful. Once a trial 
judge is satisfied that the privilege exists, a complete and total 
bar on any disclosure of the informer’s identity applies.  Outside 
the innocence at stake exception, the rule’s protection is 
absolute.  No case-by-case weighing of the justification for the 
privilege is permitted.  All information which might tend to identify 
the informer is protected by the privilege, and neither the Crown 
nor the court has any discretion to disclose this information in 
any proceeding, at any time.” - Supreme Court of Canada 
Justice Bastarache, Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, 2007 SCC 
43, references omitted. 
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ARRESTEE MUST BE DILIGENT 
IN ACCESSING COUNSEL
R. v. Van Binnendyk, 2007 ONCA 537
The accused was stopped for speeding 
and the officer noted signs of 
impairment. The officer read the 
breathalyser demand, advised the 
accused about his right to counsel and legal aid, and 
took him to the police station for breathalyser 
tests. At the station, he was again told about his 
right to counsel and legal aid. On both occasions he 
named his lawyer and said he was “not accepting 
anyone else.” He did not, however, have a telephone 
number for his lawyer.
The police found a number for the accused’s lawyer, 
called it, and left a message that he was 
in custody awaiting a breath sample and 
wanted to speak to him before providing 
a sample. A call back number was also 
left on the message. After waiting 
about an hour, the accused was told his 
lawyer had not called back and he was 
asked if he wanted to call another one. 
He declined. The police advised him that 
if he changed his mind and wanted 
another lawyer he could let them know 
and it would be arranged. The accused 
never asked to speak with another 
lawyer and two breath tests were 
taken, both readings exceeding 80mg%.  
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice on charges 
of impaired driving and over 80mg%, the accused 
argued the police violated his s.10(b) Charter rights 
and that the breathalyser results should be 
excluded as evidence. The trial judge ruled that the 
accused only wanted his lawyer of choice and was not 
reasonably diligent in exercising his right to counsel. 
The accused had not established that his s.10(b) 
right had been violated and he was convicted of over 
80mg%. An appeal to the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice was unsuccessful. 
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing that the lower courts erred in holding 
that his right to counsel had not been denied. In a 
unanimous endorsement, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
disagreed, upholding the lower judgments. The Court 
said:
…a person detained by the police must be provided 
with a reasonable opportunity to exercise the 
right to counsel and, except in cases of urgency or 
danger, the police must refrain from eliciting 
evidence from the detainee until he or she has had 
that reasonable opportunity.   The detained or 
arrested person who is offered the opportunity to 
contact counsel and asserts his right to a 
“particular counsel” must, however, exercise that 
right diligently.
While an accused person has a right to his or her 
counsel of choice, that right is not absolute.   If 
the lawyer chosen is not available within a 
reasonable amount of time, the accused person will 
be expected to exercise the right to counsel by 
calling a different lawyer…
The [accused] had the onus of 
proving on a balance of 
probabilities that his s. 10(b) 
Charter rights had been violated.  
The [accused’s] onus was to prove 
that his right to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay, and 
to be informed of that right, was 
breached.   In discharging that 
onus, the [accused] had to prove as 
well that he acted with reasonable 
diligence in the exercise of his 
right to choose counsel. [reference 
omitted, paras. 9-11]
In upholding the trial judge’s ruling that the accused 
did not make reasonably diligent efforts in 
exercising his right to counsel, the Court stated:
Here, the police informed the [accused] about 
Legal Aid duty counsel, they attempted to contact 
his counsel of choice and they repeatedly offered 
to contact a different lawyer if he changed his 
mind.   The [accused] refused all these efforts 
insisting that he would only speak with his counsel 
of choice.  In this context, including the findings 
of the trial judge that the police discharged their 
duty, the [accused] did not prove that he acted 
with reasonable diligence or that his s. 10(b) 
Charter rights had been violated. [para. 13]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“While an accused person 
has a right to his or her 
counsel of choice, that right 
is not absolute.  If the lawyer 
chosen is not available within 
a reasonable amount of time, 
the accused person will be 
expected to exercise the 
right to counsel by calling a 
different lawyer.”
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DRIVER ONLY NEED 
UNDERSTAND IMMEDIACY OF 
DEMAND 
R. v. Neitsch, 2007 ABCA 226
The accused was stopped driving by 
police as part of a Checkstop program. 
He admitted drinking earlier in the 
evening and a moderate odour of liquor 
was smelled coming from the vehicle. A demand for 
a roadside screening test was read, but the officer 
did not include the word “forthwith” in the demand. 
The test was taken and the accused failed. He was 
arrested and read his legal rights and the 
breathalyser demand. Two breath samples were 
obtained and the accused was charged with over 
80mg%.
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the accused 
argued, in part, that the roadside demand was not 
proper under s.254(2) of the Criminal Code because 
it did not include the word “forthwith”. The trial 
judge found the absence of the word “forthwith” 
was not fatal to the demand because the 
circumstances established that the accused 
understood the necessity of providing a sample 
forthwith. He was convicted of over 80mg%.
The accused’s appeal to the Alberta Court of 
Queen’s Bench was unsuccessful. The appeal judge 
ruled the trial judge was correct in concluding that 
a roadside demand under s.254(2) does not require 
the officer to utter the word “forthwith” or similar 
language if the circumstances are such that the 
accused understands the immediacy of the demand. 
The entirety of the circumstances surrounding the 
demand must be considered, including events after 
the demand, like whether the accused actually 
complied forthwith. Here, the accused immediately 
complied with the demand, only five minutes passed 
from the demand to the test, and he was told he 
would be charged if he did not comply, which 
highlighted the immediacy of the situation. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
The accused then appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal, again arguing that the judge should have only 
considered evidence contemporaneous with the 
demand when deciding whether the “forthwith” 
requirement was met and could not consider all of 
the evidence surrounding the demand. In a 
memorandum of judgment, the Court of Appeal held 
“the word ‘forthwith’ does not have to be used in 
order for a police officer to make a valid demand for 
a screening test pursuant to section 254(2) of the 
Criminal Code.” Furthermore, in determining whether 
the necessary immediacy of supplying a breath 
sample was conveyed to a driver, regard need not 
only be given to the moment the demand itself was 
made. It is appropriate to consider the broader 
circumstances to determine whether immediacy has 
been conveyed, including surrounding circumstances 
subsequent to the demand. The Court stated:
When all the critical events occur within a few 
minutes, it would be highly artificial to consider 
only the initial conversation between the officer 
and the driver in deciding whether immediacy has 
been conveyed. A brief interaction between two 
individuals does not occur in water-tight 
compartments. It is not meaningful to take 
account of a verbal agreement to comply with a 
demand, without also considering evidence about 
whether actual compliance followed immediately 
thereafter. The marginally later facts provide a 
context for the earlier. In a different case, a 
driver’s initial agreement to comply with a demand, 
followed by a retraction and refusal to do so, 
might detract from the conclusion that immediacy 
was understood. Similarly, a driver’s own testimony 
(if believed) about what he did or did not 
understand might influence a fact finder’s 
conclusion as to whether immediacy was conveyed.
Here, all the events were part of a continuum, with 
a context provided by the totality. The [accused] 
was stopped; the demand was made (which 
included the [accused’s] affirmative response to 
the question of whether he would comply); he was 
taken immediately to a nearby machine; and he did 
comply. All this occurred within about five 
minutes. Under these circumstances, there was no 
error in considering all this evidence to conclude 
that immediacy had been conveyed and that the 
demand was therefore valid.  [paras. 11-12]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
www.10-8.ca
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DOCTRINE OF RECENT 
POSSESSION NOT MANDATORY
R. v. Choquette, 2007 ONCA 571
The accused and another man were 
arrested after police responded to an 
assault complaint. Police found two 
rifles, stolen 17 days earlier in another 
city, in the SUV the men were driving. The men were 
charged with weapons offences, including possession 
of stolen weapons. At trial in the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice the accused was convicted on five 
weapons charges, including two counts of possessing 
prohibited weapons knowing they were stolen. 
The Crown proved the rifles were stolen before the 
police seized them and because of the “short time” 
between the theft and their possession, the judge 
“deemed” the accused knew they were stolen. The 
accused was sentenced to two years in prison 
following the 30 months of pre-sentence custody, 
but he appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing the trial judge erred in applying the doctrine 
of recent possession as proof of knowledge that the 
guns were stolen. 
The doctrine of recent possession allows the judge 
or jury to draw an inference of guilty knowledge 
where the Crown establishes that goods were stolen 
and the accused is in unexplained recent possession 
of those goods, failing evidence to the contrary. 
However, no adverse inference can be drawn from 
possession alone. The possession must be recent and 
the doctrine will not apply when an explanation is 
offered which might reasonably be true, even if the 
judge or jury is not satisfied of its truth. This 
inference of guilt is not mandatory; but rather it is 
permissive.
Justice Feldman, authoring the unanimous judgment 
for the Ontario Court of Appeal, found the trial 
judge did not consider the doctrine as automatic. 
Rather, he drew the appropriate inference 
supported by the evidence. Justice Feldman stated:  
Clearly in this case, as no explanation was 
offered, once the trial judge was satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the [accused] 
possessed the rifles, he was entitled to draw 
the inference that the [accused] knew they 
were stolen, if he was satisfied that the theft 
was sufficiently proximate in time to the 
possession and if there was nothing else in the 
evidence that would cause him not to draw the 
inference. However, the inference is not 
mandatory and therefore an accused is never 
deemed to have knowledge based on the 
doctrine. It merely articulates a permissible 
inference that can be drawn based on 
circumstantial evidence. [para. 11]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Doctrine of Recent Possession
“In summary...the doctrine of recent 
possession may be succinctly stated in 
the following terms. Upon proof of the 
unexplained possession of recently 
stolen property, the trier of fact may--
but not must--draw an inference of guilt of theft or of 
offences incidental thereto. Where the circumstances 
are such that a question could arise as to whether the 
accused was a thief or merely a possessor, it will be 
for the trier of fact upon a consideration of all the 
circumstances to decide which, if either, inference 
should be drawn. In all recent possession cases the 
inference of guilt is permissive, not mandatory, and 
when an explanation is offered which might reasonably 
be true, even though the trier of fact is not satisfied of 
its truth, the doctrine will not apply.” - Supreme Court 
of Canada Justice McIntyre, R. v. Kowlyk, [1988] 2 
S.C.R. 59 [para. 12]
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Conditional Sentences
“There is no doubt that Parliament 
intended the imposition of a conditional 
sentence to be more punitive than 
probation, and to be more restrictive of 
the offender’s liberty. Thus, except in 
rare cases, a conditional sentence must carry with it 
some form of punitive terms, such as house arrest 
and/or a curfew.” - Ontario Court of Appeal, R. v. 
Chartier, 2007 ONCA 706 [para. 5]
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INTERMEDIARY GUILTY OF 
TRAFFICKING IF COMMITS 
SPECIFIC ACT
R. v. Wood, 2007 ABCA 65
Two undercover officers met the 
accused, who was panhandling, and 
asked about the purchase of “an hour 
of hard”, slang terminology for  a gram 
of crack cocaine. The accused used an 
officer’s cell phone and then the three 
walked four blocks to a Safeway 
parking lot. There, a vehicle arrived and 
the accused took the buy money from 
an officer, went to the vehicle, and 
returned with the drugs (walking a 
block or two). In exchange for 
facilitating the transaction the accused was given a 
small piece of crack cocaine (known as a hoot). He 
was charged with trafficking cocaine under s.5(1) of 
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). 
At trial in Alberta Provincial Court the accused was 
acquitted. The trial judge found the accused only 
gave incidental assistance, lacked the necessary 
mens rea for trafficking, and his assistance was not 
necessary for the consummation of the purchase. 
The Crown appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal.
Justice Cote, writing the judgment for the Court of 
Appeal, first examined what trafficking entails. He 
found it did not necessarily require a sale. Section 
2(1) of the CDSA defines trafficking as any of a 
number of acts, including to sell, give, transfer, 
send, deliver, or offer to do any of these. The mens 
rea component for trafficking is knowledge that it 
is a controlled substance and intent to commit the 
forbidden act (such as transporting). Justice Cote 
stated:
Mens rea is a type of intent … 
[F]or trafficking it is the intent to 
do the act, such as sell, offer to 
sell, transport, deliver, or offer to 
deliver, etc. (It also requires 
knowledge that the chattel is an 
illegal drug or substance.)
Very different is motive. That is the ultimate 
result expected or hoped from the act or 
transaction, such as making a profit, harming 
someone, having fun, fooling someone, gaining 
attention, relieving boredom, getting exercise, 
gaining admiration of someone, or achieving some 
political aim.
No particular or any motive is needed for a 
criminal conviction for trafficking. Indeed, 
motivation is usually not needed for criminal 
liability, and is often mysterious or disputed … 
[references omitted, paras. 36-39]
BUYER-SELLER DRUG TRANSACTION OFFENCE GRID
ROLE BUYER INTERMEDIARY SELLER
Principal Charge If commits acts defined 
as trafficking, such as 
give, transfer, or deliver, 
charge trafficking
Charge
Aiding If does not commit acts 
defined as trafficking, 
but acts solely to assist 
buyer, charge simple 
possession
If does not commit acts 
defined as trafficking 
but acts to assist seller, 
charge trafficking
p
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g
 [F]or trafficking [the mens 
rea] is the intent to do the act, 
such as sell, offer to sell, 
transport, deliver, or offer to 
deliver...”
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In this case Justice Cote found the accused had 
personally committed all the elements of a 
trafficking offence. He said:
Here, the accused … kept the seller and buyer 
separate, and shuttled between the two with the 
money. I will assume that the accused was not 
himself a seller…. However, it is at least arguable 
that he “gave” the cocaine to the buying 
undercover constables. He certainly “transferred” 
and “delivered” the cocaine. He carried it first 
across the parking lot, and then part of the 
distance up [the street] to the park. And he 
certainly “offered to do” those things (before and 
at this time). [para. 28]
As for whether the accused could use “buyer’s 
agent” as a free standing defence, the Court 
rejected this argument. When someone buys illegal 
narcotics through an intermediary, that 
intermediary will not be guilty of trafficking if they 
were merely the buyer’s agent or helper (solely 
aiding the buyer) and did not commit any of the acts 
defined as trafficking. However, if the intermediary 
does commit an act defined as trafficking (as the 
accused did in this case), the fact he was helping the 
buyer is no defence. “Whom the accused assisted or 
intended to assist, is irrelevant where the accused 
personally committed forbidden acts,” said Justice 
Cote. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, a conviction for 
trafficking was entered, and the case was sent back 
to Provincial Court for sentencing. 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca
BY THE BOOK:
Trafficking
Section 2(1) of the Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act defines “traffic” in respect 
to Schedules I to IV substances as 
including “(a) to sell, administer, give, 
transfer, transport, send or deliver the 
substance, (b) to sell an authorization to 
obtain the substance, or (c) to offer to do anything 
mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), otherwise than under the 
authority of the regulations. “Sell” is also defined as 
including to “offer for sale, expose for sale, have in 
possession for sale and distribute, whether or not the 
distribution is made for consideration.” 
DETENTION DOES NOT ALWAYS 
BEGIN AT MOMENT OFFICER 
DECIDES TO ARREST
R. v. Makhmudov & Marinov, 2007 ABCA 248
The accuseds Makhmudov and Marinov 
were at a bus depot in Calgary en route 
from Vancouver to Toronto. A police 
officer, working as part of a Jetway 
program at the bus depot, smelled the zipper area of 
two identical duffle bags, noting a smell of 
marihuana. One bag was labeled “MERINOV” while 
the other was marked “KUD”. The officer secured 
the bags in the back of a police vehicle. In an effort 
to identify the owners of the bags, police 
implemented an undercover operation by telling 
passengers there was a problem with some of the 
bags and asked that they be re-tagged. The two 
suspicious bags were placed beside the bus and the 
tags removed or hidden. One officer dressed in a 
Greyhound bus sweater reviewed passenger bus 
tickets.  
A police officer asked Marinov if any bags were his 
and that they needed to be tagged properly. He 
identified one of the suspicious bags as his and told 
the officer the other belonged to his friend. An 
officer went onto the bus and asked for the 
passenger “KUD”. Makhmudov identified himself, 
whereupon he was told that some bags had been 
improperly tagged. The officer handed Makhmudov 
a tag and told him to fill it out and place it on his bag. 
At this point Makhmudov identified the second 
suspicious bag as belonging to him, filling out a tag 
and placing it on the bag. Immediately after the bags 
were identified, the accuseds were arrested and the 
bags were searched. In each bag police found 
restricted guns, ammunition, cocaine and marihuana. 
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, the 
trial judge concluded the accuseds were not 
detained, the arrests were lawful and the interim 
seizure of the bags without a warrant (placing them 
in the police car) was done by a police officer acting 
in the execution of his duty for the purpose of 
preserving evidence. None of the accuseds rights 
under ss.7, 8, 10(a), or 10(b) of the Charter were 
breached. The accuseds were convicted for weapons, 
cocaine, and marihuana offences.
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situation where the suspect admits to a killing 
while talking to a person he believes to be a new 
acquaintance – who is actually a police officer. On 
the [accuseds’] theory, 
once the admission of the 
killing is made and the 
undercover officer 
decides to arrest then, or 
at some future time, he 
must immediately, without 
further conversation, 
advise the suspect that he 
will be detained and of his 
Charter rights. He could 
not otherwise continue the 
conversation to inquire 
about the location of the body or a murder weapon. 
[paras. 15-16]
Since there was no detention, neither the accuseds 
s. 10 (right to counsel) or s.7 (right to silence) were 
engaged.
Search?
The initial temporary seizure of the bags was 
justified under s.489(2) of the Criminal Code. The 
Court held:
The initial, temporary seizure of the bags was not 
unlawful. After smelling marijuana, the police 
officer had reasonable grounds to believe the 
bags contained marijuana. The officer testified 
that the seizure was to preserve that evidence. 
The police officer’s lack of knowledge of, and 
failure to cite the particular provision of the 
Criminal Code, was not fatal. Section 489(2) 
permits a police officer in the execution of his 
duty to seize things that he believes, on 
reasonable grounds, have been used in the 
commission of an offence or will afford evidence 
in respect of an offence. Here, the section was 
satisfied and the seizure was lawful. [para. 18] 
The accuseds’ rights under s.8 of the Charter were 
not breached, the arrest was made on ample 
grounds, and the search was lawfully conducted. The 
accuseds’ appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.sa
Notable Quote
“Good faith cannot be claimed if a Charter violation 
is committed on the basis of a police officer’s ... 
ignorance as to the scope of his or her authority.” - 
Justice Romilly R. v. Peters, 2006 BCSC 1560
The accuseds appealed to the Alberta Court of 
Appeal arguing that their movements were being 
controlled by the police and therefore they were 
detained. They submitted 
that detention occurs the 
moment a police officer forms 
the state of mind that the 
suspect will be prevented 
from leaving, even if the 
suspect has no knowledge of 
the officer’s intention. Here, 
the police testified they 
would have arrested the 
accuseds if they tried to flee 
the scene.  The accuseds also contended that they 
were denied their rights under s.10(a) and (b) of the 
Charter as well as their s.7 right to silence. 
Furthermore, they argued the search of the bags 
was not justified because there were no reasonable 
grounds; the smell did not meet the plain view 
doctrine because it was not immediately apparent. 
Thus the arrests were not lawful. Finally, the initial 
temporary seizure of the bags was not authorized 
because the officer could not point to a specific 
statute or common law rule authoring the seizure. 
In a memorandum of judgment the Alberta Court of 
Appeal found there were no detentions and the 
searches were reasonable. 
Detention?
Section 9 of the Charter guarantees everyone the 
right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned. 
However, without a finding of detention there will be 
no s.9 breach. The Court of Appeal concluded there 
was no detention because the accused was neither 
physically nor psychologically detained. The Court 
stated:
The hypothetical possibility that the [accuseds] 
would have been detained if they tried to flee, 
does not establish that they were detained. The 
[accuseds] were not in the coercive power of the 
state just because the officers had resolved to 
arrest them at some future point in time should 
they have attempted to flee…
We cannot accept the [accuseds’] submission that 
the detention begins at the instance the police 
officer decides that a suspect will be arrested. 
We can postulate many scenarios where an 
application of that concept would lead to absurd 
results. To illustrate, one might consider a 
“The hypothetical possibility that the 
[accuseds] would have been detained if 
they tried to flee, does not establish that 
they were detained. The [accuseds] were 
not in the coercive power of the state just 
because the officers had resolved to arrest 
them at some future point in time should 
they have attempted to flee.”
www.10-8.ca
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STOPPING BEHIND PARKED 
VEHICLE: NO DETENTION
R. v. Lamontagne, 2007 BCSC 652
Just before 1 a.m. a police officer saw 
the accused’s vehicle parked at a 45 
degree angle on the roadway facing the 
centre with the lights on.   As the 
officer slowed down she noticed there was a female 
standing on the passenger side talking to the driver 
of the vehicle. Although there was no other traffic, 
if there had been the parked vehicle would have 
impeded it.  The officer drove by and made a u-turn, 
pulling in behind the accused’s vehicle, and turning on 
her red and blue strobe lights. She walked up to the 
car and the accused rolled down his window, The 
officer asked what he was doing and during the 
conversation noted signs of impairment; a stench of 
liquor from his breath, slurred speech, watery eyes, 
an inability to focus, producing an FAC card after 
looking through his wallet when asked for his licence. 
The accused was placed under investigation for 
impaired driving and read his rights, police warning, 
and breathalyzer demand. 
At trial in British Columbia Provincial Court the 
officer testified she stopped because she was 
suspicious (the accused’s vehicle was stopped in the 
middle of the road and there was a lady chatting 
with the driver), but had no particular offence in 
mind. She just wanted to know what was going on.  
The trial judge found the officer detained the 
accused when she pulled in behind his vehicle and 
turned on her emergency lights. In his view, the 
officer came across an abnormal situation which 
caused her to become generally suspicious. Although 
she was not performing a check stop or random stop 
and had no particular offence in mind, the officer 
wanted to know what was going on and did not 
arbitrarily detain the accused. The evidence of 
impairment was admissible and the accused was 
convicted of impaired driving.
The accused appealed to the British Columbia 
Supreme Court arguing the trial judge erred in 
concluding the detention was not arbitrary and that 
the evidence should not have been admitted. The 
Crown, on the other hand, submitted that there was 
no detention at all. 
Justice Balance agreed with the Crown. Detentions 
under ss. 9 and 10 of the Charter require some form 
of compulsion or coercion in response to a direction 
or demand of a police officer. He stated:
It is my opinion that the features of the 
encounter between [the constable] and the 
[accused] do not amount to a detention within the 
meaning of s. 9.  I would respectfully disagree with 
the learned trial judge that the activation of the 
officer's lights on her police vehicle, pulled in 
behind the [accused’s] stationary vehicle, 
converted the interaction into a detention.  
Taking into account the factual context at large, 
that act by the constable was not a means by which 
she assumed control over the [accused’s] 
movements by a demand or a direction.  Even if the 
activation of the emergency lights could be said to 
amount to a direction to remain stopped, there was 
no evidence that the lights triggered any kind of 
response on the part of the [accused].  There is no 
evidentiary foundation to find, or from which to 
reasonably infer, that the [accused] reasonably 
believed he was under any compulsion or coercion 
to respond in any way to this constable.  
The [accused’s] vehicle was already stopped when 
[the constable] came upon it.  He was operating a 
stationary motor vehicle, which he had stopped 
diagonally across a travelled portion of the 
highway.   By parking her vehicle behind the 
[accused’s] and turning on her lights, [the 
constable] was indicating to the [accused] that she 
had arrived and was a police officer, but was not 
assuming control over his movement by demand or 
direction.  
The [accused’s] conduct did not change.   He was 
stopped and seated in his automobile before the 
constable arrived at his window, and he was still 
stopped and seated in his automobile when she 
approached him in his vehicle.   Nothing changed. 
[paras. 16-19]
Being no detention there was no need to address 
whether it was arbitrary. The accused’s appeal was 
dismissed. 
Editor’s note: The accused’s application for leave to 
appeal was dismissed by the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal, 2007 BCCA 390.
Police Leadership
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REASONABLE GROUNDS 
REQUIRES SUBJECTIVE BELIEF 
BASED ON OBJECTIVE CRITERIA
R. v. Rhyason, 2007 SCC 39
The accused was driving a vehicle when 
he struck and killed a pedestrian 
crossing the street in a marked, lit 
crosswalk at a controlled intersection. 
The attending officer noted the accused had 
bloodshot eyes, an unusually blank stare, possibly 
from shock, and he blinked unusually slow. He was 
also shaking and had alcohol on his breath. He 
admitted to being the driver and was polite, but 
upset, showed no balance or speech problems, and 
did not take long to answer questions. The officer 
arrested him for impaired driving causing death 
after forming the “opinion” he had consumed enough 
alcohol to impair his driving. Breath samples were 
subsequently taken.
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench the 
accused argued the officer did not have the 
requisite reasonable and probable grounds needed to 
demand a sample of his breath under s.254(3) of the 
Criminal Code. In his view, the results of the breath 
sample should have been excluded. The judge 
disagreed and concluded that the officer did have 
the required grounds, although borderline. The trial 
judge noted there were no obvious signs of 
impairment and the signs that were evident were 
equally consistent with emotional distress, but the 
officer did have a deceased pedestrian, an admitted 
driver with a smell of alcohol on his breath, and 
minor evidence consistent with alcohol consumption. 
Furthermore, the accident itself was a valid 
component of the officer’s grounds even though 
there was no slurring, no staggering, and no unusual 
driving before the accident. The breathalyser 
certificate was admissible and the accused was 
convicted of over 80mg% and impaired driving 
causing death. 
The accused then appealed the 
trial judge’s ruling to the Alberta 
Court of Appeal again submitting, 
among other issues, that the 
officer did not have reasonable 
and probable grounds for the 
breath demand. In a 2:1 majority, the Alberta Court 
of Appeal first noted that “a finding that there were 
reasonable and probable grounds requires a finding 
that the officer subjectively have an honest belief 
that the suspect has committed the offence and 
objectively there must exist reasonable grounds for 
this belief” (internal quotations omitted). 
Subjectively, in this case, the officer’s “opinion” the 
accused was impaired was no different than an 
honest belief he was impaired.  Objectively, the 
officer had a combination of facts that the accused 
was impaired that went beyond alcohol consumption 
alone. Even without evidence of unusual driving the 
officer was entitled to consider the accident that, 
with no other apparent cause, suggested alcohol 
consumption had impaired the driver’s conduct.  
Justice Slatter, in dissent, would have allowed the 
appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new 
trial. In his view, the trial judge applied the wrong 
legal test in deciding whether the officer had 
objective reasonable and probable grounds.
The Supreme Court Decides
The accused then appealed to the Supreme Court of 
Canada submitting the trial judge applied the wrong 
test in determining whether or not the officer had 
reasonable and probable grounds for demanding a 
breath sample. He argued the trial judge found that 
evidence of alcohol consumption alone was sufficient 
by itself to establish reasonable and probable 
grounds.
In a 5:4 judgment, the Supreme Court concluded the 
trial judge applied the correct test and did not find 
the officer’s reasonable and probable grounds was 
based on alcohol consumption alone.
Justice Abella, authoring the opinion for the 
majority, first reviewed the requirements for a 
lawful demand under s.254(3) of the Criminal Code. 
Pursuant to this provision a police officer may 
demand a breath sample 
provided the officer believes 
on reasonable and probable 
grounds that the person is 
committing or within three 
hours has committed, as a 
result of the consumption of 
“[T]he circumstances of an accident 
can be taken into account, along 
with other evidence, in determining 
whether an officer had reasonable 
and probable grounds to arrest an 
individual for impaired driving.”
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alcohol, impaired driving or is driving with a blood 
alcohol content over 80mg%. The test for 
reasonable grounds has both an objective (facts, 
circumstances) and subjective (honest belief) 
component. 
In this case, Justice Abella noted, the trial judge 
correctly considered the relevant combination of 
facts:
• The smell of alcohol on the accused’s breath;
• Minor signs of impairment (bloodshot eyes 
and blank stare); 
• The accused’s admission to driving; and
• The circumstances surrounding the accident. 
On this point Justice Abella stated:
      
…the circumstances of an accident can 
be taken into account, along with other 
evidence, in determining whether an 
officer had reasonable and probable 
grounds to arrest an individual for 
impaired driving.
This is not to suggest that consumption 
plus an unexplained accident always 
generates reasonable and probable 
grounds or, conversely, that it never 
does. What is important is that 
determining whether there are 
reasonable and probable grounds is a 
fact-based exercise dependent upon the 
circumstances of the case. In this case, 
the presence of an unexplained accident 
was one factor [taken] into 
consideration when determining those 
grounds existed. [paras. 18-19]
The majority found the trial judge relied on more 
than evidence of mere alcohol consumption in finding 
that reasonable and probable grounds for demanding 
a breath sample existed.  
A Different View
The minority, on the other hand, would have allowed 
the appeal, set aside the accused’s conviction, and 
ordered a new trial. Justice Charron, writing the 
opinion of the minority, agreed with the majority 
that if there was only evidence the accused had 
consumed alcohol, this would not be sufficient to 
establish the requisite grounds for a demand under 
s.254(3). As he noted, there is a crucial distinction 
between consumption and impairment. It is not an 
offence to operate a motor vehicle after having 
consumed alcohol. Rather, the officer needs grounds 
a driver is impaired by alcohol or had consumed so 
much that their blood/alcohol level exceeded 
80mg%. 
Here, Justice Charron found the trial judge did not 
accurately state the legal test for reasonable and 
probable grounds in his judgment and, if he had, 
there might have been a different result on the 
breath samples’ admissibility. The combination of 
objective facts listed by the trial judge (a deceased 
pedestrian at the accident scene, an odour of alcohol 
on the admitted driver’s breath, and other minor 
evidence consistent with alcohol consumption) did 
not satisfy the test. A deceased pedestrian at the 
accident revealed nothing about the accused’s 
condition and the other facts referred to alcohol 
consumption only. In addressing the use of the 
accident to support reasonable grounds, Justice 
Charron stated:
…I agree with my colleague that the 
circumstances of an accident, along with other 
evidence, can be taken into account in determining 
whether an officer had the requisite grounds.  
What defeats the argument here is that the 
circumstances of the accident did not form part 
of the evidential basis upon which [the officer] 
based his demand.   Had [the officer] given 
evidence about his observations of the scene of 
the accident, and relied on inferences drawn from 
those observations as part of his basis for making 
his demand, the situation might have been 
different.  But [the officer] nowhere said that an 
“accident with no other obvious cause” formed 
part of his grounds for believing that an offence 
had been committed.   In addition, the evidence 
reveals that, at the time [the officer] arrested 
[the accused] and demanded that he provide 
breath samples for analysis, the officer had been 
at the scene for about two minutes.  Other than 
being advised that the pedestrian had died, there 
is no evidence that the officer had received any 
information about how the accident happened.  
What is at issue here are the officer’s reasonable 
and probable grounds at the time of making the 
demand, not the ex post facto inferences that 
can be drawn from the evidence at trial. [para. 28]
The appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.gc.ca
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POLICE POLICY DOES NOT HAVE 
FORCE OF LAW
Jensen v. Stemmer et al, 2007 MBCA 42
Two police officers arrested the 
plaintiff after her common-law partner 
called to report he had been threatened 
by her. The common-law partner said 
the plaintiff threatened to kill him, but she denied 
it. The officers interviewed the two parties 
separately and brought them together to get one of 
them to leave the home. An angry exchange occurred 
and the plaintiff was arrested for uttering a threat 
and was transported to the police station. While 
being driven to the police station one of the officers 
allegedly said, “Just between you an me he’s lying, 
isn’t he?”, with the plaintiff responding, “Yes, he is.”
The plaintiff sued the police for false imprisonment. 
At trial in the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench, the 
jury found the police officers did not have 
reasonable grounds to make the arrest. They 
awarded her $8,800 for false imprisonment and an 
additional $25,000 in punitive damages. The punitive 
damages were awarded because the jury concluded 
the arrest was carried out pursuant to a deliberately 
unlawful policy of the police service. 
The defendants (police officers) appealed the 
decision to the Manitoba Court of Appeal arguing, in 
part, that there was no basis for the jury to find the 
officers did not have reasonable grounds to arrest 
the plaintiff (either subjectively or objectively). 
Furthermore, they submitted this was not a case in 
which punitive damages should have been awarded.
The Manitoba Court of Appeal dismissed the 
defendants’ appeal concerning the existence of 
reasonable grounds, but allowed the appeal on the 
punitive damages issue. Justice Huband (concurred 
in by Justice Monnin) delivered the judgment of the 
Court while Justice Hamilton delivered separate 
reasons. 
The Arrest
Justice Huband ruled that it was easy to understand 
why the jury concluded the officers did not have 
reasonable grounds. He wrote:
...In my view, the jury was perfectly entitled to 
conclude that the officers had no genuine belief, 
on reasonable grounds, that [the plaintiff] had 
uttered a meaningful threat.   Firstly, [the 
plaintiff] denied having made any threat and 
maintained that position through her criminal trial 
and through the civil jury trial.   There was no 
overt reason why the police officers should have 
doubted her word.  Secondly, if the officers were 
of the belief that she had threatened to kill [her 
common-law partner], one would have imagined 
that the arrest would have been made at an 
earlier stage, rather than seeking a solution which 
would have resulted in no charges being laid.  The 
officers told the parties to find a solution which 
would have resulted in separating the parties, at 
least temporarily, which is inconsistent with a 
belief that [the plaintiff] had uttered a threat to 
kill.  Finally, there was evidence of the comment 
by [the officer], which, if accepted by the jury, 
belies any firm belief that [the plaintiff] had 
uttered a threat to kill. [para. 25]
Punitive Damages
As for punitive damages, they were inappropriate in 
this case. Punitive damages are awarded to punish a 
defendant for their egregious conduct. Here, the 
jury found the officers did not act recklessly, high-
handed, or callous. During their dealings they were 
polite and respectful and the arrest, although 
unfortunate, was done in good faith and for no 
improper motive:
There was, in short, no conduct on their part 
which would compare in any way to the 
circumstances that gave rise to substantial 
punitive damages… There was no plan or scheme 
on the part of [the officers] to commit the tort 
of false imprisonment, but rather, events 
unfolded in a spontaneous manner.  There was no 
ill motive on the part of the constables.   There 
was no attempt on their part to cover up their 
participation or to colour the facts as they 
understood them.   [The officers] did not profit 
from their conduct.  Their behaviour throughout 
lacked all elements of outrageous or egregious or 
malicious conduct.  They were not high-handed or 
insulting or demeaning to the plaintiff.  There are 
simply no grounds to punish [the officers] by the 
imposition of punitive damages based upon their 
conduct.  [para. 36]
The police policy, described by the plaintiff as a 
zero tolerance policy for domestic dispute arrests, 
was not an aggravating factor that would justify a 
punitive award for damages. The policy did not 
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mandate an arrest and charge in domestic situations 
even if officers did not have reasonable grounds to 
believe an offence had been committed. Justice 
Huband stated:
In my opinion, the document is less clear 
than it should be, but it is far from a 
document condoning arrest without a 
warrant and without the necessity of 
belief, on reasonable grounds, that an 
offence has been committed. 
The General Order instructs that in the 
absence of contradictory evidence, a victim’s 
statement alone is sufficient to constitute 
reasonable grounds for the laying of a charge.  No 
doubt that is so in many cases, but not all.   The 
victim’s statement alone must be convincing to the 
point where the officers genuinely believe that 
reasonable grounds to arrest and lay a charge do 
exist.  
Similarly, the document instructs that criminal 
charges must always be laid if there is supporting 
evidence for a charge.  Standing in isolation, the 
application of this direction could result in 
charges being laid and an accused arrested 
whether or not the arresting officers have 
formed the opinion, on reasonable grounds, that 
an offence has been committed.
However, these statements within the General 
Order do not stand alone.  The policy statement is 
very clear that charges are to be laid “when there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that a domestic 
assault … has occurred.”
To the same effect is the statement late in the 
document stating that arrest is the preferred 
response to incidents of domestic violence “where 
reasonable grounds exist to believe an offence 
has occurred.”  
It is also of significance that the arresting 
officers are instructed to contact Crown counsel 
if there is doubt as to whether charges should be 
laid.   In other words, the laying of a charge and 
the arrest of an individual is by no means an 
automatic process.
In my view, when seen in its totality, the General 
Order is not an appropriate foundation for the 
granting of punitive damages.   The document 
attempts to provide instruction and direction to 
police officers who are dealing with the very 
difficult social problem of domestic violence.  
Reading the document in its entirety, I do not 
think that police officers who are trained not to 
charge and arrest a citizen unless they have 
reasonable grounds to do so would conclude that 
any other standard would apply to a domestic 
violence setting.   The General Order does not 
cancel the responsibility of 
arresting officers to be 
guided by s.  495(1) of the 
Criminal Code.  
Finally, and of more 
importance than the 
particular provisions, the 
document is a policy 
statement, not a regulation 
or by-law.  It cannot have the effect of changing 
either the statutory law of the country or 
common law rules concerning arrests by peace 
officers.   [paras. 47-54]
Furthermore the family and domestic violence order 
was a policy statement for the police department. It 
was neither a regulation nor a by-law. “It cannot have 
the effect of changing either the statutory law of 
the country or common law rules concerning arrests 
by peace officers,” said Justice Huband. He 
continued:
The General Order may be described as a policy 
directive, but it is well settled that policy 
directives do not have the force of law.  A policy 
directive, in and of itself, cannot create an 
actionable wrong upon which damages, let alone 
punitive damages, can be assessed. [para. 55]
The Court found there was no basis for imposing 
punitive damages and the award was set aside.
Separate Reasons
Justice Hamilton, providing separate reasons, 
agreed the award for general damages was proper, 
but the award for punitive damages should be set 
aside because it was not available to the plaintiff. 
The tort for false arrest is subsumed by the tort of 
false imprisonment and occurs when a person is 
arrested without justification. The tort is a branch 
of a trespass action and a plaintiff does not need to 
establish an actual loss to prove their claim. They 
merely need to prove the defendants caused their 
arrest or detention and the onus then shifts to the 
defendants to justify their actions. In this case, 
Justice Hamilton held the jury was entitled to reach 
the conclusion they did concerning the officers’ 
reasonable grounds for arrest:
[T]he jury found that the officers did not believe 
that [the plaintiff] had committed the offence 
“...it is well settled that policy 
directives do not have the force of 
law.  A policy directive, in and of 
itself, cannot create an actionable 
wrong upon which damages...can 
be assessed.”
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for which she was arrested; that is, uttering a 
threat against [her common law partner].   In 
other words, the officers failed to demonstrate 
the subjective element of the test.  I agree…that 
the jury, based on the evidence before it, was 
entitled to reach that conclusion.  [The plaintiff] 
denied that she made the threat.   The officers 
attempted to separate [the plaintiff] and [her 
common law partner] to find another solution to 
the volatile situation other than arrest.   And 
finally, there was the evidence of [the plaintiff] 
that she replied in the affirmative when [the 
officer] asked her the following question during 
the drive to the police station:   “Just between 
you and me, he’s lying isn’t he?”  [para. 91]
As for the punitive damages award on the basis of 
the police policy, Justice Hamilton found the policy 
was appropriately put before the jury as context in 
assessing the actions of the officers, but it did not 
have the force of law and could not create “a legally 
actionable wrong upon which damages, let alone 
punitive damages, could flow.” The judge should have 
told the jury that the policy was not law. She stated:
The principle that policy directions, directives, or 
operations manuals, do not have the force of law 
has been repeatedly affirmed in the case law.  
Most notably, it has been affirmed in the realm 
of the administration of justice, including 
decisions in the area of both police services and 
prison operations… [para. 124]
And further:
…Even if the…Policy has the force of law, I would 
have come to the same conclusion.  The purpose 
of the…Policy is to provide instruction and 
direction to police officers who are dealing with 
the very difficult problem of domestic 
violence…[T]hroughout the document the police 
officers are reminded of the need to have 
reasonable grounds to arrest.   The…Policy does 
not cancel the responsibility of arresting officers 
to be guided by s.  495(1) of the Code or other 
applicable law. [para. 129]
The appeal was allowed in part. The verdict for false 
imprisonment was sustained and the award for 
punitive damages set aside since there was no 
foundation in law for it.
Editor’s Note: Leave to appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada was dismissed.
Complete case available at canlii.org
WHAT MAKES THE DIFFERENCE 
IN A CONFRONTATION?
Insp. Kelly Keith, Atlantic Police Academy
Which of the following statements do you think will 
make the difference between winning or losing a 
confrontation with a suspect?
1) I can bench press over 300 pounds!
2) I can stand still, close one eye and get a center 
shot with my handgun at 50 yards!
3) I can run a marathon in under 3 hours!
4) I can do a jumping spinning back kick 3 feet in the 
air!
Assume that you could do all of these things!  Would 
they, either by themselves or together, make the 
difference in a law enforcement confrontation?  
Although they are all admirable feats, it is unlikely 
for the most part that they would make the 
difference many people might think they would. Let’s 
take a further look at each one individually.
1. Bench pressing 300 pounds will develop 
strength, which is good thing.  But lets take a 
look at the exercise in the context of a ground 
fight.  Is pressing someone off of you the same 
as the strength you develop by bench pressing?  
I will tell you first hand that there are very 
different factors involved in escaping from the 
mount position than sheer bench pressing 
strength.  
A person who weighs 300 pounds has weight 
dispersed very differently than a balanced bar 
with the same amount of plates on each side. 
With traditional bench press, the bar is 
decelerated  on every movement. Otherwise, the 
bar would launch from your hands.  Should a body 
on top of you in the mount position be 
decelerated if you are trying to push that person 
off?  Training for power is simply moving an 
object through the range of motion as fast as 
you can with no deceleration! This is why 
medicine ball training is very valuable.  Another 
way to add some functional training to a bench 
press exercise is using a beer keg filled with 
water in which the weight moves around within. 
But ensure you have a spotter in place.
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2. Standing still and closing one eye while shooting 
long distances has very little practical 
application in a law enforcement gunfight and in 
fact may cost an officer their life if the officer 
does not understand the difference.  This feat 
suggests that the officer has great trigger 
control, is an above average marksman, and 
training of this type can be a useful tool in some 
aspects. This being said, however, is it more 
important to hit your target in a gunfight or not 
get hit?  
Statistics tell us that approximately 75 % of 
gunfights occur within 10 feet.  Another fact   
is that law enforcement officers are generally 
re-acting to a threat in a gunfight and not 
initiating it. Similarly, most officers will not 
close an eye when involved in a gunfight.  If you 
are reactive, should you not be creating muscle 
memory to move laterally or tactically while 
drawing your handgun to move to cover, or if no 
cover is available, to make it difficult for the 
suspect to hit you. 
There are times when it will be tactically 
advantageous to move in a forward direction and 
engage the threat. You need to get comfortable 
moving while drawing and shooting.  Moving 
laterally is a beneficial movement whether the 
suspect is coming at you with an edged weapon 
or a bullet.  It is fine to say that you can hit a 
target with one eye closed, but this is not what 
generally occurs in a gunfight. So why are we not 
training with both eyes open at least as much.  
We need to learn basics but we also need to 
ensure we are training law enforcement officers 
for a gunfight, not only for a marksman 
competition.
3. Running marathons and any long distance events 
is all about aerobic power.  Law enforcement 
altercations are, for the majority of the time, 
about anaerobic Power.  Law enforcement fights 
are usually over in well under one minute.  Your 
aerobic power will not have the chance to 
become a factor in this type of altercation.   
Crossfit is all about developing your anaerobic 
power and goes against many of traditional 
cardio and weight training routines. Their 
website is great and gives you a work-out every 
day to accomplish.  Check them out at 
www.crossfit.com. 
4. Last but not least, the spinning back kick!  Again 
with the majority of altercations in mind, this 
kick has very little relevance.  If you are going to 
train to “win” a law enforcement altercation you 
must keep it simple!  Forward motion arm and leg 
strikes are what we need to concentrate on.  The 
key to training to “win” is to be able to strike and 
move while you strike a moving target.  You will 
only be able to do this with confidence if you 
train this way.
The types of training looked at here all have their 
place. But we need to remember that they might not 
be as relevant as people might think they are. 
Sometimes all it takes is a little modification to the 
exercise, like the bench press, to make it more 
practical to a real world situation, such as one you 
might find yourself involved in as a law enforcement 
officer. 
About the Author - Insp. Kelly Keith is a 20 year 
veteran of law enforcement. He presently teaches 
Physical Training, Use of Force and Tactical 
Firearms to Corrections, Law and Security, 
Conservation Officers and Police Cadets at the 
Atlantic Police Academy. Kelly is a second degree 
black belt in Jiu-Jitsu and a Certified Personal 
Trainer, Strength and Conditioning Instructor, and 
a Certified Sports Nutrition Specialist. He can be 
reached by email at KKeith@pei.sympatico.ca 
‘IN SERVICE’ 
LEGAL ROAD TEST ANSWERS
1. (b) False—see R. v. Spencer (at p. 4 of this 
publication). 
2. (b) False—see R. v. DeWolfe (at p. 5 of this 
publication). 
3. (a) True—see R. v. Van Binnendyk (at p. 9 of this 
publication). 
4. (b) False—see R. v. Makhmudov & Marinov (at p. 
13 of this publication). 
5. (a) True—see R. v. Rhyason  (at p. 16 of this 
publication). 
6.  (b) False—see R. v. Panday, Yue, & Jalota (at p. 
24 of this publication). 
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BRITISH COLUMBIA
JUST SHY GROUNDS FOR ARREST: COCAINE 
ADMISSIBLE 
BC’s top court upheld a conviction after cocaine was found 
in a vehicle following the accused’s arrest. In R. v. Lieu, 
2007 BCCA 113, the accused was convicted in British 
Columbia Supreme Court on a charge of possession for the 
purpose of trafficking after police seized cocaine from his 
vehicle after his arrest. A police officer collected a number 
of tips about a drug investigation, coordinated a team of 
officers to investigate, and prepared and distributed a target 
sheet respecting the accused.  A member of the team 
subsequently observed him engage in what was believed to 
be a “dial-a-dope” deal, but could not contact the team 
coordinator. He went ahead and arrested the accused 
anyway and a search of the car turned up cocaine. The 
accused appealed his conviction to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal submitting that the cocaine should have 
been excluded as evidence because the police breached his 
Charter rights. Justice Ryan, delivering the judgment for 
the unanimous British Columbia Court of Appeal, upheld 
the conviction. Even if the grounds for arrest held by the 
arresting officer fell shy of establishing objectively 
reasonable grounds, they were just short of that proof, and 
the evidence ought not to have been excluded under 
s.24(2). 
BYE, BYE GROW OP HOUSE
An order forfeiting the home of a husband and wife 
purchased for $367,000 and used to grow marihuana was 
upheld. In R. v. Huynh and Ta, 2007 BCCA 235, the 
accuseds pleaded guilty to producing marihuana after 
police executed a search warrant at a house and found a 679 
plant marihuana grow operation. The sentencing judge 
found the accuseds had been running a large, moderately 
sophisticated, commercial grow operation on an ongoing 
basis for a considerable period of time.   Even though 
neither accused had a criminal record, the judge held that 
forfeiture of the dwelling-house would be proportionate 
to the nature and gravity of the offence and the 
circumstances surrounding its commission.   Further, the 
sentencing judge concluded the dwelling-house was not 
the principal residence of their three children prior to the 
execution of the search warrant and it was therefore not 
necessary to consider s.19.1(4) of the CDSA and the impact 
forfeiture might have on the children.   The house was 
ordered forfeited pursuant to s. 16 of the CDSA, each 
accused was given a four-month conditional sentence, a 
firearms prohibition, and a victim surcharge of $100 was 
levied. The accuseds appeal of the forfeiture order to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal was dismissed. The 
sentencing judge adopted the appropriate test in making 
the order of forfeiture and recognized that once the Crown 
had established that the property in question was offence-
related property and that the offence was committed in 
relation to that property, she was required to go on to 
consider the factors in s. 19.1(3) and (4) before she could 
make the order of forfeiture. She was not satisfied that an 
order of forfeiture would be disproportionate under 
s.19.1(3), nor was she satisfied that s. 19.1(4) applied.
CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION INSTRUCTION 
OFFENCE CONSTITUTIONAL
The provisions creating the instruction offence for criminal 
organizations are not vague nor overbroad to make them 
unconstitutional. In R. v. Terezakis, 2007 BCCA 384, the 
Crown alleged that the accused was the leader of a criminal 
organization involved in drug trafficking. He was charged 
with several offences including instructing the commission 
of an offence for a criminal organization under s. 467.13 of 
the Criminal Code. At his trial in British Columbia Supreme 
Court the judge ruled that s.467.13 was unconstitutional 
because it was too vague and overbroad. In her view, the 
meaning of the word group within the definition of 
criminal organization applied to too wide an ambit of 
persons, even those who may be unaware that one of the 
group’s main activities was serious crime. As well, she 
opined that the instructing person did not have to be a 
member of the group. The instructing offence was thus 
quashed. The Crown appealed to the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal arguing the trial judge erred. “A vague law 
prevents a citizen from realizing when he or she is entering 
an area of risk for criminal sanction. It makes it difficult for 
the authorities to determine if a crime has been committed 
and may give too much discretion to law enforcement 
officials.”  Justice Mackenzie held that the definition of 
criminal organization did “not include persons who are not 
functionally connected to that criminal purpose or 
activity, irrespective of their links to organizations with 
legitimate purposes and activities that include persons in 
the criminal group.” Further, “the instructing person must 
know that he is part of the group and exercising the 
ACROSS THE NATION
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authority of the group for the group.” Thus, the 
instructing person’s knowledge they are part of the 
criminal organization, “plus the fact that the instructed 
offence must be connected to the criminal organization 
avoids the risk of an overbroad ambit to the offence”, and 
it is therefore not constitutionally flawed.  
MUST LOOK AT THE WHOLE, NOT PIECES
A court must look at the totality of the circumstances 
when assessing the grounds for a search warrant, not each 
fact in isolation. In R. v. Nguyen and Nguyen, 2007 BCCA 
264, the police applied for and were granted a search 
warrant, finding a moderately sized marihuana grow 
operation in the basement of a residence. The accuseds 
were convicted of producing marihuana and possession for 
the purpose of trafficking. They then appealed to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal. After arguing the information 
to obtain the search warrant was flawed, the accuseds also 
submitted that the remaining information was insufficient 
to support the warrant. A defence lawyer argued that each 
of the remaining pieces of information (the smell of 
marihuana, condensation on the windows, and a marked 
increase in hydro consumption) could be explained in a 
way unrelated to a marihuana grow operation.  Justice 
Saunders, for the unanimous appeal court, disagreed 
stating, “While there could be other explanations for each 
of the observations, taken as a whole they present support 
for the warrant.”
ALBERTA
FLIGHT HELPS PROVE GUILT
Fleeing a crime scene can be used as evidence of guilt. In R. 
v. Callahan, 2007 ABCA 320, a police officer saw three 
people running from a strip mall that had been broken into 
in the early hours of the morning. One was arrested by the 
officer, another was found hiding under the deck of a 
nearby house, and the accused was found in a tree about 
five houses north of the strip mall.  No one else was found 
in the area. The accused was in possession of the keys to an 
unlocked rental car found in an alley near the strip mall.  
The car had been rented for him by a friend and there were 
items in the car that were consistent with shop-breaking 
tools, including a flashlight which was identical to the type 
of flashlight found in the premises broken into. The 
fingerprints of all three men were also found on this car. 
The accused was convicted on three counts of break-in and 
breach of recognizance. He appealed to the Alberta Court 
of Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge erred in 
considering his flight as consciousness of guilt for the 
break-ins. The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed. The 
trial judge considered that the accused might be fleeing and 
hiding because he was in breach of his recognizance, but 
she dismissed it because it was a minor offence and he was 
more likely fleeing and hiding to avoid being caught for 
the break-in. The appeal was dismissed and the convictions 
were upheld.
SASKATCHEWAN
NO APPEAL FROM s.117.03 FIREARMS 
FORFEITURE ORDER
There is no right to appeal a forfeiture order under 
s.117.03(3) of the Criminal Code,  Saskatchewan’s Court of 
Appeal has found.  In R. v. Hudson, 2007 SKCA 82, the 
accused told police the time and place where he proposed 
to demonstrate the use of an unregistered shotgun. The 
police attended, seized the shotgun under s.117.03(1) and 
took it before a Provincial Court judge. The judge ordered 
the gun forfeited, but the accused appealed the forfeiture 
order to the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench, further 
alleging s.117.03 was unconstitutional. The Queen’s Bench 
judge ruled that she had no jurisdiction to entertain an 
appeal from the forfeiture order and suggested an 
application for declaration under civil action procedures be 
pursued in relation to the Charter issue. This decision was 
further appealed to the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. In 
dismissing the appeal, Chief Justice Klebuc noted that 
“appeal courts are solely creatures of statute and have no 
right to create appeals.” In this case, neither s.117.03 nor 
s.839 of the Criminal Code provided the right of appeal 
from any order made pursuant to it. Nor did a breach of 
the Charter create a right of appeal because it is not an 
independent source of appellate jurisdiction. The appeal 
court, however, did not decide whether the civil application 
respecting the Charter issues was available or appropriate.
MANITOBA
TIME SERVED CANNOT FORM PART OF YCJA 
DISPOSITION
The Manitoba Court of Appeal has held that a Youth Court 
cannot make pre-sentence custody part of the youth’s 
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formal sentence. In R. v. T.(G.A.), 2007 MBCA 88, the 
young person plead guilty to several charges after  spending 
106 days in custody. The sentencing judge included 90 
days of the time served as part of his disposition along with 
a one year probation order. The Crown appealed to 
Manitoba’s top court arguing the sentence was illegal 
because a youth sentence comes into force on the date it 
is ordered or a later date (s.42(12) Youth Criminal Justice 
Act (YCJA)). The Manitoba Court of Appeal agreed, 
stating that a court cannot backdate a sentence under the 
YCJA. The Youth Court can, however, take into 
consideration time served by a youth, which will mitigate 
and reduce the sentence on sentencing day, perhaps even 
eliminating any need for additional custody. 
PRESENCE IN BUNKER PROVES INVOLVE-
MENT
Be careful where you brush your teeth. In R. v. Johnson, 
2007 MBCA 14, police found a very large and 
sophisticated hydroponic grow operation consisting of 
eight railway cars buried side-by-side underground, with 
doorways interconnecting them all.  There was a farm 
house on the property and some of the buried units were 
also used as living quarters. The accused wasn’t around 
when police raided the operation, but they found some  
evidence he was at the farmhouse, including personal 
effects in one of the bedrooms, a receipt showing he 
bought a reverse osmosis machine that was used in the 
grow-op, and his fingerprint was on a stereo cabinet. In the 
bunker, police seized a rifle that belonged to him and a 
toothbrush with his DNA. He was convicted of several drug 
offences and sentenced to four years in prison. He argued 
in the Manitoba Court of Appeal that the judge’s verdict 
was unreasonable because the circumstantial evidence 
against him was insufficient to establish, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that he was a party to the grow-op. The 
Court, however, disagreed. Justice Huband found that 
once the accused’s presence was confirmed in the bunker, 
a place intended only for those involved in the illicit 
operation, his involvement in the criminal activity was 
confirmed. The evidence was inconsistent with any other 
rational conclusion. The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
ONTARIO
BAIL IS NOT JAIL
A five member panel of Ontario’s highest court has ruled 
that bail, even pre-trial house arrest, cannot form part of a 
mandatory minimum sentence. In R. v. Panday, Yue, and 
Jalota, 2007 ONCA 598, the accuseds were convicted of 
various serious criminal offences, including ones involving 
a firearm that have minimum mandatory sentences of four 
years. While awaiting their trial, they all spent more than 
30 months each on strict bail. The sentencing judge gave 
partial custody credit for their time spent on strict bail 
(approximately one-for-five), considered it punishment 
of imprisonment, and made it form part of the minimum 
four year sentence.  The Crown appealed and the Ontario 
Court of Appeal overturned the sentencing judge’s ruling. 
Strict bail has a punitive aspect but it is not the equivalent 
of actual incarceration, said Justice MacPherson for the 
three judge majority. Thus, a sentencing judge does not 
have the discretion to consider time spent under pre-
sentence bail as the equivalent of actual custody and use it 
as credit towards calculating the mandatory minimum. The 
two dissenting judges, on the other hand, concluded that 
“where a trial judge is satisfied that time spent under strict 
conditions of pre-sentence bail is, in substance, the 
equivalent of a period of actual custody, the trial judge 
does have the discretion to give some credit for that time 
towards the calculation of the mandatory minimum 
sentence.”
GUN ADMITTED EVEN IF DETENTION 
ARBITRARY
The Ontario Court of Appeal did not exclude a gun found 
by police during a street check even if they violated the 
accused’s Charter rights. In R. v. Grant, 2007 ONCA 26, 
the accused was convicted of possessing a firearm while 
prohibited and breach of probation. He had been stopped 
by police in a high crime neighbourhood where the police 
had been requested to attend by the community and the 
officer knew him, knew that he did not reside in the area, 
and knew about his prior criminal activity. The officer 
initially observed him with a woman, a known prostitute 
and crack user, and also observed the accused acting 
suspiciously. He was “blading”, a police term for 
attempting to conceal a weapon.   The officer asked the 
accused to walk to the police car for a C.P.I.C. check, at 
which point the officer noticed a bulge in the left side of 
the accused’s pants. He was searched and found to be in 
possession of a sawed off shotgun. The accused appealed to 
the Ontario Court of appeal arguing he was unlawfully 
detained and searched, that his rights under the Charter 
were infringed, and that the evidence gathered should have 
been excluded under s.24(2) of the Charter. The Ontario 
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Court of Appeal concluded that even if the accused was 
arbitrary detained, the evidence was admissible. The 
detention was quite brief, the accused had a reduced 
expectation of privacy in a public area compared to his 
home, and questioning was minimally intrusive. And even 
though the police had prior knowledge of and dealings 
with the accused, they did not act in bad faith. Further, the 
Crown’s case depended entirely on the gun. “The police did 
not grossly overstep the bounds of legitimate questioning, 
acted in good faith, used no force, and were patrolling one 
of Toronto’s high-crime areas,” said the Court. “The repute 
of the justice system would suffer if the evidence were 
excluded.”
NEW BRUNSWICK
OWNER’S PERMISSION NEEDED TO 
BORROW GUN: THEFT MADE OUT
A locked gun is notice that it was not to be borrowed 
without its owner’s permission. In R. v. Charters, 2007 
NBCA 66, the accused was charged with several offences, 
including break and enter after he went into his parents’ 
home and used a hacksaw to cut the chain on his father’s 
Winchester rifle and take it. He was 29 years old, had not 
lived at home for about a year and  did not have permission 
to go into the house that day or take the gun, but had 
often before used the gun during hunting season. At his 
trial he was acquitted of the break and enter and of the 
included offence of theft. The judge found a reasonable 
doubt about the accused’s mens rea on the break and enter 
charge and theft did not apply because he did not take the 
gun—or fraudulently and without colour of right convert 
the gun to his own use—with intent to deprive his father 
temporarily of it. The Crown appealed to the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal arguing the trial judge erred on 
the included offence of theft. The acquittal was overturned 
and a conviction of theft entered. The actus reus had been 
proven—the accused admitted to taking the gun without 
his father’s permission. As for the mens rea, the accused did 
not assert a colour of right defence. Even if he had, there 
was no evidence he honestly believe that he had the right 
to cut the chain and remove the gun without his father’s 
permission. Colour of right might have been a plausible 
defence for entering the home, however, it was not a 
defence for cutting a chain to remove a gun from a locked 
rack—which signaled notice to all that it was not to be 
borrowed without the key holder’s permission. 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Colour of Right
“The term "colour of right" generally, 
although not exclusively refers to a 
situation where there is an assertion of a 
proprietary or possessory right to the thing 
which is the subject matter of the alleged 
theft.  One who is honestly asserting what he believes to 
be an honest claim cannot be said to act "without colour of 
right", even though it may be unfounded in law or in 
fact.  The term "colour of right" is also used to denote an 
honest belief in a state of facts which, if it actually existed 
would at law justify or excuse the act done. The term when 
used in the latter sense is merely a particular application of 
the doctrine of mistake of fact.” — Ontario Court of Appeal 
Justice Martin, R. v. DeMarco, (1973) 13 C.C.C. (2d) 369 
(Ont.C.A.), references omitted.
YUKON
STAY NOT APPROPRIATE IN DESTROYED 
VIDEO
A new trial was ordered after a judge ordered a stay in a case 
where a police officer destroyed a VICS recording (video in 
car system) of an encounter with the accused. In R. v. 
Buyck, 2007 YKCA 11, the accused was charged with 
assaulting a peace officer, resisting arrest, assault with a 
weapon, and escaping lawful custody after a routine check. 
A police officer attempted to arrest the accused after 
stopping him in his vehicle, detecting a strong odour of 
marihuana and seeing a marihuana stub in the ashtray. As 
attempts to place handcuffs on the accused were made, he 
picked up a shovel in the box of his pickup, swung it at the 
officer, and then drove off, only to turn himself in the 
following day. About three months later the officer again 
stopped the accused, who was breaching his recognizance. 
The accused apparently apologized to the officer for his 
earlier behaviour but no notes were taken. The incident was 
recorded on an in car video system. Unfortunately, the 
officer did not connect the two incidents and the video was 
recorded over as per police policy. At his trial, the accused 
argued that the destruction of the video from the second 
encounter violated his right to disclosure and his ability to 
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make full answer and defence was affected. The judge 
found the officer’s failure to preserve the video was 
“unacceptable and inexcusably negligent”, violated the 
accused’s right to full disclosure, and did irreparable 
prejudice to the integrity of the judicial system. He ordered 
a stay of proceedings which effectively ended the 
prosecution. The Crown’s appeal to the Yukon Court of 
Appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered. A judicial 
stay of proceedings will only be granted in the rarest of 
cases, where a stay is the only appropriate remedy. First, 
allowing the prosecution to continue in this case would 
not perpetuate or aggravate the police officer’s conduct. 
Nor did ending the prosecution outweigh society’s interest 
in getting a verdict on the merits of the case. Here, a stay 
was not an appropriate remedy for the breach of the 
accused’s right to full disclosure ruled the Yukon Court of 
Appeal. 
SAFETY SEARCH INCIDENT TO 
TRAFFIC STOP REASONABLE
R. v. Thibodeau, 2007 BCCA 489
A police officer saw the accused’s 
vehicle driving on the wrong side of the 
road late at night.  Eventually, the car 
veered back into its own lane and the 
officer sopped it and spoke to the accused, the 
driver. The officer asked the accused to produce 
her driver’s license and registration.  She produced 
the registration, but was unable to produce her 
driver’s license after she looked in her wallet for 
some extended time.  According to the officer, the 
accused appeared more nervous than most people 
who are simply being stopped for a Motor Vehicle 
Act infraction.  She was wearing a fanny pack around 
her waist but avoided looking there for some time. 
 
The accused turned her body away from the officer 
at which point he could no longer see her hands.  This 
made him nervous and very concerned for his safety; 
he wondered whether she might be looking for a 
weapon. The accused handed him her driver's 
licence, but kept herself turned away so that the 
officer could not see her hands.  He told her that he 
wanted to see the bag and her hands.   After she 
said, "I don't think I have to do that", the officer 
responded, "I need to see your hands and your bag. 
I am concerned about what's in the bag."  She then 
passed the bag towards him.  He reached into the 
vehicle window and took control of the bag. The 
zipper on the smaller of two zippered pouches on the 
bag was open and the officer could plainly see a small 
baggie of crystal methamphetamine. The accused 
was arrested for possession of a controlled 
substance, escorted to the police vehicle, read her 
rights under s. 10 of the Charter, and given the 
police warning that she did not have to say anything. 
The vehicle was searched as an incident to lawful 
arrest and a yellow backpack on the backseat was 
searched; a larger quantity of drugs, a scale, cell 
phones and notebooks was found.  The accused was 
then told she was under arrest for possession for 
the purpose of trafficking and again informed her of 
her rights.
During a voir dire in British Columbia Supreme Court 
the trial judge admitted the  methamphetamine and 
drug paraphernalia. The trial judge found the 
accused’s initial detention was not arbitrary because 
the officer had witnessed an infraction of the Motor 
Vehicle Act.  The search of the accused’s fanny pack 
was not a fishing expedition for evidence; the 
officer was looking for weapons, not drugs. Nor was 
the search unreasonable. The officer was justified 
in concluding, objectively, that the search was 
reasonably necessary to confirm that the accused 
was not looking for a weapon in her fanny pack. In 
the judge’s view (1) the accused seemed more 
nervous than the circumstances, in the officer’s 
opinion, would warrant, (2) she had turned her body 
away from him, (3) she had looked in her wallet for 
one or two minutes before starting to look in her 
fanny pack for her driver's licence, and (4) the 
officer could not see her hands and what she was 
doing with the fanny pack. As for the search of the 
backpack in the vehicle, it was proper as an incident 
to arrest. The accused was convicted.
The accused appealed to the British Columbia Court 
of Appeal arguing the trial judge erred in failing to 
consider the totality of the circumstances when the 
officer took the fanny pack. First, she argued that 
once she made her hands visible and gave him the 
fanny pack there was no need to search it because 
he would have no longer had a concern for his safety. 
Second, there was no suspicion of criminal activity, 
unlike the leading case on investigative detentions 
and searches in the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision R. v. Mann, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59. 
Justice Newbury, delivering the opinion of the 
unanimous British Columbia Court of Appeal, agreed 
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the search was reasonable. As for the first point she 
stated:
[T]he constable was concerned for his safety, 
based on the four factors outlined …  and ... these 
constituted objective grounds for that concern.  
The request to see [the accused’s] hands and 
fanny pack then began a course of steps – her 
bringing the fanny pack forward, making her hands 
visible, the officer’s reaching and taking the fanny 
pack from her – that it would be unreasonable to 
try to divide such that at some point before he 
looked into the fanny pack with his flashlight, the 
legal situation suddenly changed, and the search 
became improper.   In other words, it would be 
unreasonable in my view to require the officer to 
have suddenly said “Never mind” once he could see 
[the accused’s] hands (if indeed he could, apart 
from the fanny pack).  The factors listed by the 
trial judge still obtained throughout the few 
seconds this series of steps would have taken. 
[para. 9]
On the second point, Justice Newbury upheld the 
trial judge’s ruling that the officer acted reasonable 
even though it was only a motor vehicle offence he 
was investigating, and not a criminal one.
With respect to Mann, I am not persuaded … the 
Supreme Court’s concern generally for balancing 
privacy expectations with concerns for officer 
safety, do not have application, or have very 
diminished application where only a Motor Vehicle 
Act offence is concerned.  Certainly, the fact [the 
officer] was dealing with this type of offence as 
opposed to a murder or bank robbery is one of the 
circumstances to be considered as part of the 
“totality”, but the fact remains that police 
officers may have valid safety concerns even 
where the offence is not a crime and even where 
the person detained seems polite and co-
operative. [para. 10]
The search of the backpack was also valid as an 
incident to arrest. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
JUDGE LACKS JURISDICTION 
TO ORDER RETURN OF VEHICLE
R. v. Peric, 2007 ONCA 738
The police had towed a tractor-trailer 
unit to a towing compound after it 
collided with a train.   The accused was 
the lessee, not the driver of the unit, 
and was charged with criminal negligence and 
dangerous driving because of the vehicle’s alleged 
unroadworthy condition. The tractor - trailer 
remained at the towing company’s compound for over 
two years until the police and/or Crown released its 
control of it.  In the meantime, however, the towing 
company disposed of the vehicle to recover the cost 
of storing it.  The accused brought a pre-trial motion 
before the judge at his criminal trial in the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice seeking an order under 
s.490 of the Criminal Code that the Crown return 
the tractor-trailer unit to him.  The accused’s motion 
was dismissed. 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal submitting that the seizure and detention of 
the tractor-trailer was never authorized by any 
judicial authority.   He argued that the procedures 
respecting the seizure and detention of property set 
out in ss.489, 489.1, and 490 of the Criminal Code
were not followed.   He claimed just restitution of 
value of the truck-trailer unit in the amount of 
$42,000. He also contended that the police were 
responsible for paying any costs of storing property 
they have detained for the purposes of their 
investigation. The Crown argued it was not 
responsible for the storage costs or for the vehicle.  
The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the accused’s 
appeal. Since the towing company had disposed of 
the vehicle the judge could not order the Crown to 
return it.   The vehicle, whether properly seized or 
not, was no longer in the hands of the Crown. The 
accused’s claim for just restitution of the value of 
the truck-trailer was a civil claim, over which the 
judge presiding at the criminal trial had no 
jurisdiction.   The accused did not seek any of the 
remedies that were within the judge’s authority—
there was no prejudice to the fairness of the trial 
and no evidence obtained from the Crown’s 
inspection of the vehicle was sought to be excluded. 
The issues of civil liability could be the subject of 
further litigation, but were not within the purview of 
the judge at the criminal trial.  
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
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The British Columbia Association of Chiefs of Police, the Ministry of Public Safety 
and Solicitor General, and the Justice Institute of British Columbia, Police Academy 
are hosting the Police Leadership 2008 Conference in Vancouver, British Columbia, 
location of the 2010 Winter Olympics. This is Canada’s largest police leadership 
conference. The conference is held every two years and attracts international, 
national and regional speakers and delegates.
The theme for this year is:
The Future of Police Leadership 
One World, One Voice, One Purpose. 
The subtitle of the conference ‘One World’ recognizes the globalization 
of law enforcement and crime, ‘One Voice’ recognizes the 
convergence of communications and technology, And ‘One Purpose’, 
to break down some of the institutional barriers and recognize law 
enforcement’s primary goal of crime reduction and prevention.
